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THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY

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ANALYSIS

Analysis.

The importance of method in philosopy.

Present methods inadequate because onesided and extreme.

Attention will be called primarily to the neglected elements in knowledge and the knowledge process.

Objection that philoscphy needs no special method. But the fact that science and philosophy formerly were not distinguished is not a reason why they should not be so now if found to be distinct ,and the self limitation of science makes this distinction real.

There is a real difference between science and philosophy. Science views its objects under a special aspect. Philosophy does not. The field of philosophy does not lie in the treatment of the principles of science.

Methods in the history of philosophy.

Socrates--saw the necessity for a methodical procedure.

Plato transformed the induction of Socretes into intuionism.

Aristotle rejected the intuitionism of Plato and insisted on the use of analysis ,primarily.

The Aristotelian method supreme in the Middle Ages.

Breaking away from Aristotle --in Bacon.

Bacon's insistence upon an extensive use of induction.

Galileo supplemented the induction of Bacon with the mathematical theory of motion.

Descartes added to the e the demand for a single highest principle. His method misused by his followers culminating in the

Geometrical method of Spinoza.

The critical method of Kant

Hegel and current criticism. Empiricism.

Relation of method to the conception of the reason. It is necessary to ask what the reason and knowledge are.

The reason an acquisition .

Distinction of faculties as types of mental activity.

The self a unit in knowledge and the intellect holds a dominant place.

The claims of mystics and other non-intellectualists are worthy to be examined.

The relation of the factulties to their source shows this to be found in an original somewhat and,differentiated into activities,form what we call faculties.

This "somewhat" is not what we call sensibility.

All faculties must be evaluated with reference to this somewhat.

Evaluation of the faculties brings us nearer to the center of our inquiry.

Relation of the intellect to living knowled_e.

Intellectualism in philosophy.

The mystics the most radical anti-intellectualists.

The anti-intellectualism of Bergson. Intellect a falsifying element ; intuition alone adequate. It gives reality because it penetrates to the real.

An attempt to state a view of the mind which does not

necessitate the elimination of any one phase.

The non-intellectual in knowledge is a real element to which progress in knowledge is due,mainly.

The chief characteristic is that of discovery.

Analysis the most characteristic work of intellect. It is most prominent because most tangible and public. This is aided by the close relation of analysis and language.

Pure intellect is unreal--an abstraction. There is an intellectual consciousness but not apart from other kinds of consciousness.

Reach the heart of the matter only by placing ourselves at the source of knowledge and the intellect.

This shown by the place of the self in knowing activity.

Essence of knowledge found in this original and fundamental personal experience of the self.

All intellectualized knowledge is a development from this by definition,articulation,etc.

Knowledge,therefore, not merely perceptual though one's complete knowledge can never be expressed in conceptions.

Bergson's view of the intellect understood from this basis.

The supremacy of this more living knowledge seen in that which is the basis of all theories : a certain non-intellectual element of feeling or intuition.

This element is of the nature of conviction.

Original impulse to knowledge of the nature of a demand.

Satisfaction of the needs of the whole self is the criterion of the knowledge obtained.

Objection that it is the business of philosophy to understand. This assumes a certain erroneous view of what it means to understand. The non-intellectual in Mr Bradley's philosophy evident
Important to distinguish between the process and the product of knowledge.

The conception of knowledge must be broadened ,then, to admit such non-intellectual elements as are effectual in knowledge.

Dogmatic rejection of all experiences,intuitions, insights,etc.,is not allowable . "e cannot exclude without first understanding.
Other categories of knowledge possible.

Return to the question of method.

Induction and deduction found to be inadequate. Valid so far as they go but do not go far enough.
Analysis also does not go far enough and cannot be applied directly to the problems of philosophy.
Analysis cannot give us new knowledge. It is inadequate because it is the instrument of the intellect which is itself inadequate.
Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction is not adequate because it seeks the real in the phenomenal.
Defense of Plato and Hegel- neither forsook particulars.
Mr Ward's historical method inadequate because the One cannot be attained except by a leap--an intuition.
The "pure experience " of James speculative and superfi cial.

The reflective method .

Must recogni e the presence of other than merely intellectual elements in knowledge.

Must include both analysis and discovery. The characteristic work of the intellect is analysis; the characteristic work of the more non-intellectual side of mental activity is discovery.

These two asp cts combined form what may be called the Reflective Method.

Consciousness and experience form the starting point in actual thought.

This work will reveal the presence of the non-intellectual elements in knowledge.

Their significance then must be determined.

The result of the reflective method will be the recognition of a more living,spiritual character in thought and in reality.

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY.

An essay dealing with the knowing mind and the methods proper in philosophical procedure ,as required by the facts of knowledge and the knowledge process.

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY.

It is a truism in life that in doing a thing success depends quite as much on the way one goes about the task as in the ability which one brings to the doing of it. It is so in philosophical inquiry. The first impulse to this discussion is the many ways of doing things in philosophy at the present time. One man takes his stand beside the intellect and rejecting all feeling, intuition, interests, and ideals clings only unto this. Another seizes a passing intuition and believes that he can attain the very heart of the real with the wings of this fleeting intuition. Still another throws himself upon the first brute fact at hand and clings like death to this, bidding defiance to every high a priori wind that blows. It is not so much the diversity of methods, however, that is objectionable as the extreme and exclusive manner in which some are held and the ignoring of important elements in the knowledge process itself. It is quite probable that the richness and many-sidedness of reality , together with our narrow finite vision, makes it not only necessary but desirable that there should be many methods of discovering the real. But it is quite impossible to me that reality can be found either in mere thought, intuition, or so-called bare fact, as such. For me, to make any headway it seems necessary that these various claims be examined and that a different attitude be taken. Hence I would not discard all present methods of inquiry or any of them perhaps but the importance of right method should be insisted upon and present methods examined in order to find whether there are not grave defects in our use of them and in their co-ordination which hinder progress in philosophy. In the end it is largely a question

of viewpoint taken relative to the mind and knowledge. If some satisfactory and comprehensive view of knowledge can be found, then the methods will shape or reshape themselves with reference to that standpoint. As for any essentially new method I regard that as fairly out of the question, for the history of philosophy has developed so manifold a way of procedure and conception that fundamentally new methods are not probable. After all the Greeks did a pretty thorough business of developing the conceptions of philosophy. It is to the unemphasized, the neglected , the ignored of human thought and knowledge that we may profitably turn. Later I shall have occasion, however, to note the wonderful depth of the mind, as also its comprehensiveness and to suggest the possibilities of new categories that may be discovered or which may emerge as the mind grows. For as we shall see, the mind is a plastic thing and capable of unforeseeable growth and expansion . I shall suggest too, that the time seems to have arrived when attempts to discover some of such categories may be profitable. But it will only be suggested , and a radically new or different theory of the mind is not contemplated. I only mean to examine and to point out some obvious but neglected aspects of the mind which are quite significant and if developed, I believe, might lead to radical conceptions.

Of course the importance of method can be over-emphasized. It is of no great importance in itself but only in relation to the success of one's undertaking . The greatest gain was made in philosophy when it became methodical in Socrates. Moreover, a clearer consciousness of one's method may well prevent an immense amount of waste labor. And a constant criticism of

one's method and of the instrument and conception of knowledge is necessary if one would escape pitfalls. The importance of method is shown in the fact that the development of every one of the special sciences followed upon the discovery and adoption of a method.

The objection is made,however, that philosophy needs no method other than those of the sciences . It is said that those are sufficient for a knowledge of the real, that when a fact has been looked at from all sides -- as science would look at it-- there is nothing more to be known about it. Science with her methods can find all there is to be known about the real. If we must distinguish science from philosophy, these critics would allow philosophy to deal with the principles of science. But that is as far as philosophy may go. Of course,it needs,then, no special method of its own. It is pointed out that formerly science was not distinguished from philosophy and that they should not be distinguished now. But that seems no argument, for the fact that some or all for that matter in the past have not distinguished them is no reason why they should not be distinguished by us if they are really distinct. The fact is that formerly they were not distinguished because the different conceptions were not what they are today. Science was not at all what modern science is. Modern science claims to know exactly what it is about and just how it must proceed. It has not always known it. The self-limitation of science has only made the field of philosophy clear in making its own field clear.

There is a real difference between philosophy and science . When it is said that after we have looked at a thing on all sides and thus explained it, this is all the knowledge that is possible about it,one very important fact is overlooked. That fact is

that science by its own self-limitation has deliberately chosen to look at a thing in its own way and the object as an object for science is a special case of the real object. The "sides" of the object for science do not coincide with the "sides" of that same object for philosophy. In short, science really does not claim to look at an object from all sides. Hence the philosopher has no objection to that statement if science holds to its own interpretation of what " on all sides" means, and philosophy be allowed to hold its own interpretation also. There is then no conflict . Thus science looks at things under a special aspect only and does not pretend to investigate the real or ultimate nature of the object. The thing or object appears to science as a dead thing, a part of a mechanical whole and not a living object. Even life and live things are considered in a mechanical way when studied by science. Science thus begins by assuming a view of the world which philosophy has never agreed is the true view. It may not unfairly be said that philosophy has pronounced a mechanical view of nature false. But no matter, science cannot take the place of philosophy simply because begins and holds to a certain view of reality which if taken in a metaphysical way is quite questionable. The world for science is not the world as it is but the world as assumed to be for the purposes of science. To the scientist, for instance, anything that violates the principle of the uniformity of nature is not real, but as a matter of fact that principle has never been scientifically demonstrated nor philosophically justified. It is assumed and held because it works, because with it other things seem manageable . The same thing is true of all scientific principles --they are abstractions and meant to

characterize a certain aspect of reality in order to make the task of science , which is that of description,fruitful.

The field of philosophy,moreover,cannot lie in any mere treatment of scientific principles. In the first place,they need no philosophical treatment in the interest of science and if their philosophical value or truth is to be estimated that is no concern of science . Science is quite able to formulate its own principles and methods and outside interference is respectfully declined. It is, in fact, only as scientists become confused that the philosopher may tell them that they are outside their field and that there their principles do not necessarily apply and have no occasion to be applied.

Philosophy was formerly the handmaid of theology but some today would make her the handmaid of science. Formerly, too,the philosopher was sometimes charged by the scientist with being superstitious and that was offensive . But now the charge is that of being unscientific and it is sometimes felt to be no less offensive and disparaging. If to be scientific means to be methodical,thorough,exact, and balanced,then every philosopher should be and wants to be scientific. But if it means more-- that we adopt the methods and standpoint of science-- then one may glory in the infirmity. For in the last analysis, to be scientific after this manner is to be a mere naturalist in philosophy --which is really a contradiction if taken strictly. Philosophy deals with the living and with the dead--if there be any dead--and not with the arbitrarily mechanical and naturalized world. Philosophy need not conform to the principles of uniformity of nature, or of causation in the scientific sense or any other scientific principle unless it

find it to be valid for ultimate reality. And if the philosopher finds freedom to be a fact he need not ask science whether he may say so or believe it. Hence until scientific principles are found -and by the philosopher himself--to be valid for reality, he need not be coerced by them.

Philosophy should follow the methods best suited to its own kind of inquiry. There will be no conflict unless someone gets confused and in that case a healthy fight will often clear the atmosphere. The danger to philosophy is not that of conflict but that of supinely drifting into uncritical assumptions and methods. There is real danger that a weak acquiescence in the ideals and methods of natural science shall force living reality into the background and create an atmosphere hostile to enthusiasm for a spiritual view of reality. Philosophy already suffers grieviously from the overbearing rule of a crass naturalism. Some claim Kant as the destroyer once for all of metaphysics . But,apart from the question whether he did so aim in his critical work ,he certainly reinstated it most gloriously in his positive doctrine, in his insistence on the demands of the moral consciousness and in his magnificent determination that, whatever criticsm had done, the moral consciousness should be supreme and in reality build for itself a world which should satisfy its own deepest demands upon the real. There is plenty of need for his spirit in philosophy both in its critical and its positive significance. There is need to for philosophy to assert its right to its "place in the sun", to insist upon its own field of inquiry and its unquestioned sovereignty.

The methods used in the course of philosophy have been

various. The Greeks began with plain observation of nature. The method might be called the inductive though there was hardly anything methodical in the procedure until Socrates. The sort of knowledge, then, was the perceptual. With Parmenides conceptual knowledge had its rise. The method was transformed accordingly. The development of speculation brought about a more purely deductive method. Everything was deduced from an original assumption. In some cases the original first principle was to be gained by induction and analysis, as in Des Cartes. Then by a misunderstanding of Des Cartes the method of geometry was applied to the treatment of reality and life. Both rationalism and empiricism were corrected by Kant who called his own method criticism. The post-Kantian idealists, in general, took their standpoint with Plato in the eternal. There is another, however, which has recieved less attention in philosophy but which has been used in all periods of philosophy, sometimes consciously but usually unconsciously. It might be called the intuitive method. Here the claim to immediacy, self-certainty, etc., find their expression. The mystics have used this method and they have not been a mere handfull. Those who claim knowledge through experience, intuition, etc. may be grouped here. Induction and deduction have been the methods most clearly formulated and they seemed always to be the ideal ways of procedure. To be sure there have always been a conflict which is an apparently inseparable accompaniment of consciousness itself. Facts seem to be always particular things and never general or abstract and yet the general principles seem to be quite as necessary. Thus the mind is never content to remain among mere particulars and it often loses itself in the general and abstract.

It has been thought that one or the other of these must be true and the other somehow not true. It has,however,been suggested that there is some way of viewing them as one,both true and neither, when taken alone, true. But there was always that opposition between proceding from some highest principle which must be true and from particulars which seem to be real. Neither method,of course,has ever been used wholly without the other, nor can be so used. Emphasis or theory have divided thinkers and we have those called Rationalists,Intellectualists,Empiricists,etc. Then,as said, there have always been those who have insisted that we do not come to reality either by reasoning one way or the other but by a perception of the real itself,by an immediate experience or by a oneness with the real. But these latter have been indulged usually as wayward brothers,romanticists, mystics,or sometimes as sentimentalists.

Philosophy became methodical,then,with Socrates. His method,however, was limited by the purpose which he had in view. This was not at all to formulate a system of philosophy. His interest was more immediately practical. The task of philosophy for him was to formulate conceptions . Obviously that was the most necessary thing in the beginning of philosophy and it is the great merit of Socrates to have seen it. Philosophy can do nothing without conceptions and the Greeks did their work so well that it has not needed to be done over again.

Plato transformed the induction of Socrates into intuition. By intuition he reached the Ideas and from there he determined the content of his world. There has never been in the history of thought a greater leap- a more daring intuition. Plato took his stand in eternity and there all idealistic philosophers have

tried to maintain their stand beside him. Modern thinkers sometimes forget, however, that to attain that position requires a leap--an intuition of the soul. Here, then, is an application of the method of intuition and who shall say that in this instance the intuition was not a fruitful one and true also.

Aristotle did not like the method of Plato. He preferred to analyze until the last ground of things was reached and from there to find his way by deduction. Approximation to truth satisfied him and he did not believe in taking the soul upon such a long journey as Plato had done. It was a difference in method by which the one highest principle was to be attained. That principle once attained all else should be deducible from it. Aristotle cast his spell over succeeding generations so that in the Middle Ages philosophical inquiry degenerated into the most barren logical manipulations.

The breaking away from this spell of Aristotle was in the interest of nature and the facts of experience. The method was to be that of induction. Bacon laid down the program of an empirical philosophy and insisted on induction and this to the exclusion of deduction. But he did not carry his method through in actual practice. He meant to reach general axioms by means of induction and from there to explain other truth. But he too was enmeshed in the formalism of Scholasticism and thought the task was to discover the simple form of things. And the method of finding them was to be that of induction.

Then Galileo conceived philosophy as the doctrine of the motion of bodies and united the mathematical theory of motion with induction thus making truly remarkable inductions possible--inductions which almost rival the intuitions of Plato in

imaginative leaps.

With Des Cartes modern philosophy is usually said to be in. The influence of methodical natural science upon modern philosophy has been supreme and with the new impulse of sciences in the Nineteenth Century has become quite oppressive. As has been pointed out, the beginning of modern philosophy is to be sought in methodical reflection rather than in new conceptions with new contents. "...It is characteristic of the greater number of the systems of modern philosophy to seek the path of the real or 'material' problems by considering the science of method and the theory of knowledge : and in particular the 17th century with respect to its philosophy may be characte ized as a strife of methods." (Windelband, History of Philosophy, p.379.) It is this dominance of the methods of natural science which seem to some to be the present difficulty in philosophy.

Des Cartes added to the contribution of Bacon and Galileo the demand that the method of induction should lead to a single principle of highest and absolute certainty from which experience was to be explained. He will thus find by the method of analysis the certainty of the being and existence of consciousness. Here in the self-intelligible elements of consciousness is found the fundamental truth. From this everything is to be explained.

Des Cartes meant to use the method of analysis mainly and the synthetic only as a method of discovery from one intuition or intuitive truth to another. But his followers misunderstood him and mistook the method for the rigid demonstration of Euclid. This method was fully developed in Spinoza who insisted on attaining the real by the geometrical method. All reality was to merely "follow" from a logical principle.

Empiricism and Rationalism in their extreme form found a sufficient critic in Kant. The method which he used was that of criticism--an examination of the reason itself, of the basis of knowledge. Here as always a fruitful development in philosophy was begun by a criticism of the reason itself. The speculative system following Kant come in for much criticism at the hands of the present-day anti-intellectualists. Hegel especially is thought to have used a very objectionable system. It is said that he began,or pretended to begin,with the One and determined all else from this abstract One. The nature of particular phenomena is determined by the place they have in the unfolding of the divine spirit. He analyzed the content of consciousness and found conceptions which are categories of reality, forms of cosmic life- moments in a single unitary development. Reality is what it ought to be in this movement. Particulars must be understood as members of this whole.

It is this treatment of particlars and their deduction from an abstract One which furnishes the basis for contemporary criticism of Hegel and his followers. Not the whole but the particulars,say his opponents,are real. And they must be taken as they are given in perception not as they may be deduced from a fictitious One. Some demand an historical method by which the facts of history are taken in their temporality and manifoldness. If any One is reached it must be from there. Experience is to give us the real and speculation and rationalism are to be done away. Universals,unities,categories,none of these are wanted. The brute fact only is of importance. Hence we have radical Empiricism, pure Experience, and perceptual knowledge. Conceptions are only tolerated because they are only temporary

makeshifts . Perceptions alone give us the real. Conceptions blind and confuse us. We suffer them at present because of men's infirmities but some day they shall be done away with. Then shall we see clearly and truly.

We have then in the history of philosophy a number of methods used, such as induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, criticism and empiricism. There have been also those who have claimed to know reality in some non-intellectual, immediate, absolute manner. These are represented mainly by the mystics. Now since the question of method is always subordinate to and based upon the conception of the reason and the knowledge process, criticism of the usual methods is postponed until theories of the reason and knowledge are examined. Then when a statement of viewpoint concerning these is made the proper method as well as criticism of other methods will follow and be based upon that viewpoint.

In general the method one uses will or at least should depend upon the conception of the reason which one has. The question as to the nature of knowledge should precede that as to the nature of the real and the way in which one goes about it to find the real. In fact all philosophical inquiry proceeds either with an implicit or conscious conception of the reason and the method will likely depend upon that conception. Hence it is necessary that we ask what knowledge is and what the process of its attainments must be. It is not intended to give a theory of knowledge in the full sense. There will be some criticism of the prevailing conceptions of knowledge and some suggestions as to what changes should be made in them. The starting point is the general interest in finding precisely

what knowledge is and what the knowledge process means. We know that we know and that we learn to know. But what does this mean?

The reason is an acquisition rather than an original possession. Not only are ideas as such not innate but even the faculties into which we analyze the mind are not, as such, innate. Reason is developed. Consciousness comes as does the dawn and is seemingly imposed from without. The first awareness is perhaps of an other-self. The mind has to learn to control the body and the outside world becomes a cosmos only with time. Finally the faculties,--as intellect, sensibility, will-- become distinguished and the mind thinks, feels, wills. It is quite false to say that these faculties make up the mind. The individual, the I, the self has <u>them</u> rather than they make <u>it</u>. As separate and discrete faculties, entities they are abstractions. We can make the facts transparent only when we say <u>I</u> think, <u>I</u> feel, <u>I</u> will. The <u>I</u> is forever the reality.

The use of the term "faculty" is not a recognition of that particular kind of psychology but is used only because it is convenient. For practical purposes we may divide the soul into certain faculties but my contention here is really based upon the ultimate falsity of any such division. The self undoubtedly is one and there are faculties only because there are different forms of expression or of action on the part of the one unitary self. Faculties are abstractions and as such cannot or should not be held to have real existence. It is the self which is and this self, under various aspects, as will,

sensibility,intellect makes itself known to us.

Why,now, do we say that we have such a faculty as the will? It seems simplest and closest to fact to say that we are conscious of acting or manifesting or expression ourselves in different ways. An exercise of volition will come to be regarded as a typical way of acting. It is a characteristic mark of mind. But not the only characteristic mark of mind. We abstract these typical marks and say that the mind has such a faculty,meaning such a type of action, such a characteristic manner of expressing itself. These different actions are capable of classification and distinction . We name these faculties.

Intellect,sensibility , will as faculties of the soul are abstractions but they point to something quite real. No abstraction is real and just because it is an abstraction. But there can be no abstraction of that which is not. Now , these so-called faculties are capable of,in a measure,independent action,so that a person may reasonably be classed as of the intellectual type,for instance. Sometimes we find a person who seems to be almost wholly one type or another. But a person who would be nothing but one of these would be an abstraction. The soul can never be just equal to or synonomous with one or all of its faculties. It never exhausts or transmutes itself into a faculty or particular type of activity. They are still "its" faculties.

It would be instructive though no absolutely necessary to know just how and why the soul comes to develope,thus presenting such distinguishable ways of acting. It is likely that they answered,at least in the beginning ,certain purposes of a practical

sort. The preservation of the organism may have necessitated just such typical behavior as we find in mental life. Anyway we have them and we ought to try to understand them.

Well, we have what we call knowledge and it is something gained by an effort and has stages. The stages form process. If we look back over our mental life we find many interesting things. We find that when we first began to blink at the sun everything was in confusion. We were not very conscious that we were confused but we later found that we were. The world, in fact, was just a "big, blooming, buzzing confusion". We perhaps realized the presence and existence of other objects and persons before we did that of ourselves. We found that when we reached for a bright object we reached all over instead of using only those members which were intended to reach with. We did not know that there was such a thing as "far" and "near" objects. Later we learn that all bodies have that character. Then we find that the physical affects us in certain ways and we have what we come to call sensations. Then we get percepts, form concepts and see an object as a particular thing. The world of nature is "out there", independent of us. Later we get to questioning or reading some one who has questioned before us and after a long process of wrestling with prejudices, beliefs, sense testimonials we come to the conclusion that the world is not at all what we thought it was. We must now admit that what we find to be ideas were wider in scope than we thought and that that all was about that we do have. Of course some never find this out but most who read do. We someday perhaps come to believe that the reality we know is the reality we make and that is a hard saying. After all this if we had not been careful we might have

gone on and have constructed a system of metaphysics but even though we were spared that we have learned that knowledge is a strange thing and not wholly clear as to its matter and manner.

It is I then who know but I am usually said to be made up of intellect ,sensibility ,and will. Knowledge must be a matter of a faculty since that is what my manner of action is termed. Then it must be of the intellect. It is very natural that we should so think and answer . Indeed we have named it the faculty of knowledge just because this is the particular function of the soul which seems most characteristically the activity of knowledge. Of course there have been those who have thought that knowledge was only a matter of sense perception. The soul was merely the recieving board and upon this the sensations associated themselves in a free manner and thus we have knowledge. The intellect was then merely a name and not a real function of the soul--there turned out not to be a soul in fact. But Kant and time have helped most people who think past that particular weakness.

But apart from the unfortunate sensationalist there have been a respectable number of persons who have insisted that while knowledge is of the earth earthly there is a particular kind of knowleuge which is consummated in heaven and that it is not a matter of the intellect at all but just in cessation of all intellectual processes. It is a oneness with the real. Then some,a very great number to be sure, have insisted that they know the real in some sort of experience which is other than an intellectual affair . The verdict has not always,then, for the intellectualist. It is worth investigation.

The relation of the intellect to knowledge should be more clearly defined. But first something must be said as to the relation of the faculties to their source . It is too easily accepted that when one has accounted for and described mind as intellect,sensibility,will one has wholly accounted for it . But the faculties are developed and differentiated out of an original somewhat which is the source of thinking,feeling,willing. This somewhat is personality in the sense of the deepest and most fundamental reality of the self. It is not a defined,articulate, formulated reality. It is non-relational,a genuine whole which may be said to be a felt-whole . But it is not feeling as an affection of the sensibility . It is the basis of the sensibility-the I,the individuality ,and personality which thinks,feels,wills.

This it is which has the functions or activities which come to be known as types in the intellect,sensibility,and will. Looked at from the side of the acts themselves the mind appears as intellect,sensibility,and will. But looked as the I thinking, willing,feeling ,it is this original reality. It is important to insist that this differentiation,this abstraction is not a thing done once for all so that the reality is henceforth the result of differentiation and abstraction as such. The original felt-whole is in no way taken up or dissipated. It is not transmuted into faculties. There is nothing, moreover, pictureable about this source of all activity. It is not a reservoir but simply the I,the self. As personality or self it is a living reality,capable of infinite enrichment and development.

It is necessary also to insist that this somewhat is not at all what we mean by sensibility or feeling. The sensibility

is a certain abstraction and differentiation from out this somewhat. It is a relational way of feeling,and a specific activity directed toward a particular object. The sensibility has no closer relation nor is it any more like the original somewhat than is the intellect or will. This somewhat is neither sensible,intellectual,nor volitional. It is that with which the intellect,sensibility,will must be evaluated.

The question of the evaluation of the several faculties of the soul brings us nearer to the center of our inquiry. The discussion will have to do principally with the question of the intellect and its relation to the more living self. And in particular to what is called intuition. A prominent tendency has been known as rationalism or intellectualism. It has had many particular forms but these may be ignored. The characteristic has always been the glorification of the intellect and the disparagement of feeling and volition. As rationalism it reached its height in Wolff and its overthrow in Kant. The way of the intellect is the only way of knowledge. When the power of the intellect is emphasized to the extent of ignoring empirical fact and all non-intellectual demands it is called rationalistic, and meant usually to be disparaging. But of course all rationalism is not of the extreme kind and often means merely that we be rational.

More recently a strong current of criticism has been directed against the so-called intellectualism. The most radical opponents of the intellect as the faculty of knowledge have been the mystics. They have always claimed that reality can be known only in cessation of all intellectual activity. Its knowledge is a union,a coming into oneness with the real.

It is not sense knowledge nor knowledge of the intellect but a real perception of the divine. Not only is the actual knowledge of reality non-intellectual but there is no possible intellectual apprehension of this kind of knowledge. One who has really known the real, after the fashion of the mystic knowledge cannot say what it was he knew- it is impossible to put such knowledge in terms of the intellect. The language was not lawful to be uttered. One may be inclined to class mystics as non-intellectually minded persons, to whom intellectual work is distasteful. They are usually brushed aside as out of the category of rationally minded thinkers. But it is a noteble fact that the great mystics have been the keenest intellectualists and the subtlest of dialecticians. The conclusions of the mystic are reached after an analysis which is of the most arduous kind but they find after all that the intellect is incapable of giving true reality and that such is found in a quite non-intellectual exercise.

Perhaps the most thorough indictment of the intellect is that of M.Bergson. He takes his standpoint with life and finds that the intellect is incapable of comprehending life because, in the first place, it is not so wide as life being only a deposit of life and ,secondly, it is a positive reactionary force which would hinder and destroy the true reality. Life is an evolution and the initial impulse is the source. The intellect is a slightly retarding factor in this evolution. It is a falling back, a petrifaction. Besides this upward movement of evolution there is a second, a downward movement to which intellect, in part, belongs. Moreover, the intellect is not only a hindering and obstructing element but a falsifying element. The intellect does no repart truth about reality but that which is

false, artificial,momentary. And the worst of it is that it cannot help it,that is its nature. The intellect finds its natural home among solids and can deal with nothing else. It cannot know the living but must transform it into the dead,take snapshots of the movement while the movement itself escapes. Its view then is external,artiiicial,arbitrary. Reality is movement and this intellect can never know though it can give snap-shots of it. It is thus like the cinematograph,giving only stages in the flow not the flow itself. Life,movement escapes it. It must be emphasized that this knowledge is positively false for there are no such things as moments in reality ; it is a movement. The intellect distorts reality.

Intuition,on the other hand,can give us the real. In intuition we come into an immediate and real knowledge of the very heart of reality. This comes in a relaxation of the intellectual effort and by a projection of ourselves into the very movement of reality itself. The intellect breaks up the flow of the real into discrete moments but intuition takes us into the very midst of the movement itself. Intuition is closer to life- it is molded after the form of living reality while the intellect is molded after the form of inert matter,of solids. Intuition is the real,vital element; intellect the accident,the unavoidable. Had the original impulse been strong enough the movement would have been completed without reaction . But it is finite,hence the intellect has to do primarily with the dead cinders that fall back from the upward movement of fire.

There is a possible view of the mind,however ,which may furnish a means of escape for some of the difficulties without necessitating such elimination of an element of mental life such

as the above calls for. This is the view which I wish to suggest as the basis for the right method in philosophy. There is evidence in every day life and in the discovery of great truths of a form of activity which is not merely intellectual. We find in every day life that the practical guide is in part a certain instinctive, intuitional, faith element. We have the experience of the race; we have fancy, desire, longings, and moral demands, as also the very important aesthetic demands and interests. Moreover, there is in all sucessful thinking an element of other than intellectual labor. It is to this non-intellectual element that progress in new truth is mainly due. It is seen in the familiar fact that intuition often runs ahead of the intellect. Indeed I do not know but that it always does. It might be astonishing to know just how much of our more strictly intellectual work has other than intellectual demands as its impetus and how much our theorizing is really for the purpose of confirming a belief or some feeling element of our nature. And when we look at the great philosophers we see evidences that the impulse to intellectual activity has not been an unmixed intellectual impulse. Plato was an artist ; Kant a moral hero ; and some say that Hegel was mystical. At any rate a non-intellectual element is always present in significant thinking. Then advance is often made in intuitive or imaginative leaps rather than by a closely reasoned process. Discovery is usually a leap in the dark . And the attempt of modern idealists to account for our objective world by an unconscious creation or construction of the self is quite suggestive. It may be said that there is never a divorce of this element from the more strictly intellectual processes. An exhaustive study of data

is necessary to scientific achievement and the intellectual is the most noticeable feature but it is surely not the whole of the matter nor the only significant feature. One may call it instinct or fancy or whatnot but it is there and will remain there whatever it may or may not be and it will not be disposed of by calling it names.

The chief characteristic non-intellectual element on the side of action is that of discovery. The chief characteristic of the more purely intellectual element is that of analysis. Analysis is not the whole of the task of the intellect but it is the most characteristic work. The intellect analyzes and defines and this makes articulate the non-intellectual factor. It takes an intuition, for instance, or what we sometimes know as hypotheses, and analyzes them. Private feeling, intuitions, etc., need to be translated into a social language, or to be expressed in symbols which are social property. In view of this relation of the intellectual and the non-intellectual elements in knowledge it is idle to ask which is supreme. The intellect is certainly the most prominent, and as to the great body of scientific knowledge it seems almost wholly intellectual. But that is partly seeming and would appear somewhat otherwise if proper analysis were made. For one thing, scientific knowledge is largely of the practical sort. Here the intellect is an instrument in gaining the needs of life. Science is interested mainly in furnishing a type of knowledge that is communicable and which by its exactness may be used to meet the demands of human nature and life. It is thus closely analagous to language. And the close relation of intellectual analysis to language helps to give the impression that it is wholly

intellectual. This relation to analysis comes about because analysis is merely to make the subject matter articulate. And that articulation of meaning is just what language is.

To come to hardest fact, I do not believe that such a thing as pure intellect exists at all. It may be possible to abstract from active knowledge so that something like mere intellect may be exhibited but it is impossible to exhibit a purely formal or intellectual knowledge. Knowledge is a living thing and while we may abstract we also lose finally all trace of real knowledge. It is impossible to think merely and at the same time really. There is more than the merely intellectual reasoning. Indeed, in the most subtle and nice discrimination of abstract thinking there is even an increase in a certain non-intellectual element so that the whole has a heightened effect, something like elevation of the spirit, and not wholly unlike what is commonly understood by inspiration. It is true that quite often the presence of feeling hinders and obscures reason. But there is feeling and then feeling and it is not impossible that in its most refined and purest quality feeling is nothing blinding and confusing but an illuminating element. It were better to have another name for this important fact in the mental life. It is not a matter of sensibility but of the quality of life itself--the liveliness of life. It is of the nature of insight, of spirit, personality and indefinable. It is in the highest ranges of thought that this quality is found to be most pervasive. Hence the peculiar flavor of admirable intellectual work. It is a sort of blending of intuition and thought--an intellectual intuition. It is exhilerating but the exhileration of a most wonderfully pure and refined atmosphere.

Of course it is quite proper to say that we have an intellectual consciousness. But it may not be quite sharply defined as over against other types of consciousness and made thorough-going ,that is,radical. There is always a fringe, a margin where they merge and interpenetrate. Some persons are characterized by one type,some by another,but none are wholly any one type. They are not mutually exclusive,in reality. They seem so only in abstraction. For practical and also for theoretical purposes the division is real and legitimate ,but it is somewhat artificial.

The heart of the matter will not be reached by a mere analysis of the faculties of the mind. We seek to understand knowledge but knowledge is a living thing and we must not seek the living among the dead. We must place ourselves not beside faculties as abstract entities but at the source of these faculties . It does not seem impossible either to take our standpoint there with the original and living source of knowledge. We have only to remember that it is after all I who think,feel,and will,and that I am neither one nor all of these but the originator of them. I am conscious of myself as a thinking,feeling, willing being. These are my several activities. I am also a living being and my thinking is a living thinking . We think of feeling and acting as closer to that which we call life but just because my thought is different and perhaps more abstract it is not therefore a merely abstract and lifeless thing. Thinking is just as much a living of myself,of my inmost being as is feeling or action but it is different. Thinking activity , then,is living activity .

Now, it is this personal,living,spiritual character

of the thinker that gives character to thought. It is not that the sensibility interferes with it or is mixed in thinking but just because it is I, a spiritual person who thinks he has qualities akin to sense and volition. Because feeling and volition are also valid expressions of my self. Hence when it is said that thinking has something of the non-intellectual it cannot be charged that we are surrendering to a mere feeling, It can only mean that living thought gets the quality of life from the thinker. Of course many, perhaps, most people feel instead of think much of the time and that, too, where they should think instead of feel and their rational life is cumbered with swarms of emotional prejudices and blind instincts, but that does not mean that when thought is developed and found alone it has none of the non-intellectual. It only means that the mind is not developed rationally.

It is from this standpoint that I may define my knowledge of reality. I have an original experience of a somewhat that is, as said above, undifferentiated, non-relational, a whole and felt to be such. In itself it isakin to feeling but a feeling which goes beyond itself. Its chief character and reality is an ideal one. It is that with which all thinking whatever begins and with which all ends, for the matter of that. It is inseparable from my innermost self or personality and it is also the only reality that I know. My experience or conscicusness is knowledge and of the living kind. It is the essence of my knowledge of the real and remains forever the essence or all reality. It cannot be got behind and is unanalyzable . It is undefined excepting to a small degree, inarticulate, unformulated, incommunicable as it is. But all our science and the results

of all our intellectual labor is only the definition of this, the formulation into social signs so that it may not only be communicable and shared but that it also may be a definite thing to me. I experience, I live it, I am in my deepest self just it.

The mass of the worlds knowledge, the innumerable and unnameable systems of thought, the horde of definitions and conceptions are just the result of the attempt of the mind to comprehend in conceptual form this original somewhat. Which means that it is the deepest fact of personality in the act of expressing itself. Now those who would limit all knowledge to the perceptual and who find in conceptual knowledge only a distortion of reality are only arguing for the making of this felt knowledge the whole of our knowledge. Of course that which we habitually call knowledge is incomplete and shall always be so simply because the real is not resolvable into the forms of the intellect. The mind will never lose itself in one of its faculties for the mind is life and life is reality. No theory is sufficient, no conception is adequate once for all to express what I know to be the real. We do accept theories more or less and sometimes find conceptions which seem to meet our approval but they will not always do so, because life will sooner or later break the arbitrary limits thus set it. Thus the endless search for the eternal wears on. It is the task of life and perhaps of the real itself to thus come to expression. But we human beings will never and do never know what it is to define, to formulate, to express in conception that which for us is real except at the price of some of the richness and liveliness and immediacy of what we know to be the real. The deepest somehow escapes our conceptions and if we fool ourselves for a

time we shall some day come to know our mistake.

We may see now why it is that the intellect takes only snap-shot views of the real,why its knowledge is artificial ,false, external,why the living escapes it. We may refute the extreme expression of this view but we shall never refute the deep insight into the knowing self which the view itself indicates. The intellect is in its very nature inadequate to give us reality as it most really is in its wholeness,because it is precisely the task of the intellect to present the real to us,to define it,to formulate it, to translate it into a social language; but life , reality is forever more than a formula,a conception, a particular articulate thing. The intellect is just the faculty we have to make this attempt to make reality a public or social possession. There is no sense in deriding the intellect. It does its work most efficiently and it is absolutely necessary and a valid and vital form of our life. But it is made for and serves a special purpose and the nature of its task makes it forever impossible to quite succeed in what it sets out to do. There are lots of contradictions in conscious life but this is a very significant contradiction. This is the contradiction and the tragedy of finite selfhood. Personality itself is,as we know and value it, aproduct of this process and the process will yet more and infinitely more enrich personality. All that we have of articulate selfhood,all that is significant about us as social being, is due to this fundamental effort of the self to make itself clear to itself in conceptions. In this process the coarser elements of the personal and social life will fall away and refinement will grow with enrichment and efficiency. Rationalization

of life is the very development of personality itself and it is also the revelation of reality and the growth of intellectual efficiency, of aesthetic appreciation, and of moral power, the coming of one to one's self to the true reality, or better, the coming of the true reality to finite selfhood.

The supremacy of this more original and fundamental knowledge of the living spirit is seen in the quite obvious fact that our theories and accredited conceptions of the real are dependent upon this fundamental attitude of the soul for their acceptance. Much of the theoretical work is done to make articulate and define what is sometimes a belief. No theory that contradicts the living faith of humanity can long find acceptance. The soul demands that the intellect formulate a satisfactory theory. All theories about reality have their source and warrant, then, in this fundamental attitude of the mind. In the last analysis all theory is traceable to this source as the intellect itself finds its source there. Here is the last ground for our practical certainty and for fruitful labor. Life, then, is the source of theory and not theory of life; it is greater than theory and logic and opposed to the merely theoretical or logical.

The fundamental attitude is of the nature of conviction. Conviction is something like a felt certainty but it is more. It is a positive demand, the demand of one's deepest self. It is this sort of thing that is the arbiter of theory. Every theory about the real finally, if analyzed, reduces to some such an attitude or conviction. Reality is what it ought to be and what our deepest demands insist that it shall be. The rule of conviction means that theory shall square with life. It matters

not how rational one may become,this positive attitude of the soul is fundamental and mandatory. But it is not opposed to reason,as such, or to theory. It is only the conflict of life and artificiality,inadequacy formality,etc. It means that the living knowledge of the soul is ultimately the true knowledge of the real.

The original impulse for all knowledge seems to be of the nature of a demand. In its early stages at least it is mostly practical. The intellect itself may well have been developed in answer to a practical demand or need,perhaps of a social nature. In general,the nature of the demand which lies at the basis of knowledge is a demand for some sort of satisfaction or a fulfillment of a need . There are somewhat superficial and capricious demands arising from the different sides of our nature but this fundamental demand is none of these . It is deeper than these. It is a demand of my deepest self. As this need becomes more conscious,more articulate it appears as a particular need. It is the work of the intellect to make that need and the demand articulate. As formulated it is something less than the whole need for it is a demand of the deepest and widest of interests. It is the demand of the whole nature though "wholeness" not in the sense of a summation of particular elements of my nature. It is the demand of personality ,of the original felt-whole of my personal life,of my being.

Now, I shall know that I possess the real when I am satisfied. My satisfaction is not that of mere caprice or of thoughtless wishes,but of my life. My dissatisfaction is really an indication of my ignorance. I shall never know reality, however,completely because my dissatisfaction is radical and

strikes at the roots of the real self. I demand to come wholly to myself, to comprehend what I know and am in my real self. But the way in which I am to do that is of such a nature that it can never be complete, for to do so would be the comprehension of ultimate reality. And that by a special activity of the self, such as the intellect would be the very negation of reality. I do however find relative and temporal satisfaction. I find relative knowledge and a knowledge which for a time seems fairly adequate. But just as I seem to be at rest and my needs seem to be fulfilled the infirity of my life surges up within me and I am again tossed about in the sea of doubt, the unknown and the unattained. I become a dissatisfied self. Such is life. It is manifestly somewhat of a contradiction and a good deal of a tragedy but it is life.

It is objected that the business of philosophy is to understand and that the intellect is all that needs to be satisfied. We have other needs and dissatisfactions and demands of other sides of our nature but these have no reason to appear in the court of philosophy. Now, it is, of course, surely the business of philosophy to understand. But it is assumed here that understanding is purely an intellectual affair. That does not, however, seem to be the case if the view of knowledge and the intellect here suggested has any truth. The contention is true if philosophy be taken in a narrow enough sense. If we mean by philosophy a formula of reality, a system of concepts, then of course the one necessary thing is that that system be intellectually consistent. But this has to do with the formal side and not

the actual live knowing of reality. Philosophy as completed product is an affair of the intellect because a product of intellectual work but philosophy as an actual process of gaining insight into the real is far from being a merely intellectual affair.

Mr Bradley insists that the philosopher understand and if he have any but the purely intellectual in his philosophy he has left his field. This,however, is just our problem. The contention of this essay is that there are other elements always present and moreover that they are valid. One will seek in vain for a philosophy that does not show the presence of such non-intellectual elements. They actually do play a part and to deny or ignore them is arbitrary . Spinoza attempted to work out a rigidly geometrical system yet the source of all his effort was in the passion of the soul and not in the pure intellectual demand for a logical system of philosophy. Mr Bradley's whole system is the satisfaction of a demand which is,however, not wholly intellectual . A mysticism pervades the whole of it and the fact that he insists upon consistency in the finished product is not a proof that in him the intellect is alone at work in his philosophy. He begins by rejecting important things because to the intellect as such they are contradictory ,but he ends with the confession that we can know the real only in feeling. "Nothing in the end is real but what is felt and for me nothing in the end is real but that which I feel." (Appearance,-p.190.) Again , "in one sense I agree that we never can break out and pass beyond feeling. Everything that is real must be felt. "(Reality and Truth,p.157). Now, if philosophy is to give us the real and nothing in the end is real but that which we feel then feeling cannot be absent from the reality which the philosophy gives.

That is, feeling enters into my knowing. The consciousnes which is present in my knowledge of reality is not a purely intellectual consciousness. But if this element is present how am I to deny that it is a part of a knowing process?

As to what we finally call real and true, Mr Bradley takes a position not wholly unlike the one taken above,namely, the real and the true are what satisfies the demands of our nature. He denies that any part of our nature except the intellect may claim recognition but does admit that they do get recognition indirectly --that is,through the idea and the intellect . But we have insisted that that is just the office of the intellect-- to find a satisfying answer to our demands. " An actual object ", he says,"fails to satisfy us, and we get the idea that it is incomplete and that a complete object would satisfy us. We attempt to complete our object by a relational addition from without and by relational distinction from within. And the result in each case is failure and a sense of defect. We feel that any result gained thus, no matter how all inclusive so far would be less than what we actually experience. Then we try the idea of a positive non-relational whole, which contains more than the object and in the end contains all that we experience. And that idea,--- seems to meet out demands."(Reality and Truth,p.188). Further," the contradictory and the meaningless fail to be true because in a certain way they do not satisfy. They produce a special kind of uneasiness and unrest; and that on the other side which alters this unrest into an answering contentment is truth". (Ibid,p.1.) Thinking ,he holds , consists in the pursuit of a certain kind of satisfaction -- intellectual satisfaction.

But now the point is what does an intellectual satisfaction include and what does it finally mean. Mr Bradley admits that other elements of our nature recieve satisfaction indirectly through the intellect. Is it possible for the intellect to satisfy itself with unsatisfied demands of our demands pounding away at its door? Can we so isolate one phase of our activity meet its demands without meeting those of other phases? To me such a claim is not only false but vicious. For it is impossible to think of intellect as in any sense independent of the deepest self or as any thing but an organ of that self. It is an instrument and it exists primarily in the interest of the self . Of course there are interests and satisfactions which are mainly intellectual. But I cannot believe that if the philosopher does not enter the search for the real with his whole self and with all his powers that he is likely to find it. Some superficial phases of philosophy may be enjoyed, as the mathematician enjoys building the worlds which he may ,but such is not true philosop y. I do not doubt ,moreover, that the demands of my moral nature,for instance, get satisfied in idea and through the intellect but the fact that the intellect is finally to solve my philosophical problems and bring satisfaction does not mean any thing to me except that that is its natural and special function. It is the instrument by which balance and harmony is restored, though I am glad that the real as it is in me constantly destroys that balance and harmony and thus ensures that I shall not become a merely artificial being.

The terms " uneasiness" and "unrest" do not apply to a pure intellect. Uneasiness and dissatisfaction involve feelings of some sort. There can be no"intellectual demands"

of a pure nature because a "demand" involves other than an intellectual element. A demand is always an assertion of will. I cannot see,then, from the above that Mr Bradley himself,though he insists so much on philosophy as understanding,really holds to his ideal. After condemning so much,even the self, as being intellectually inconsistent , he turns,in his positive exposition, always to feeling,experience,and teaches that feeling in the end as in the beginning is that in which we know the real,though feeling in the end is not non-relational, undifferentiated feeling of the beginning having been pierced by relational contradictions and finally becoming supra-relational and in this sense the source of the true and the real. To Mr Bradley the use of the intellect discovers only contradictions and impossibilities. It is only when the intellect and all relational kinds of being are transmuted into something higher that feeling,purged of the relational inconsistencies into which it fell , becomes the only means of coming into contact with reality. He is really not so far from M.Bergson as might appear.

There is an important distinction between the process and the product of knowledge. The process is a most living activity, in which all powers of the soul are engaged and rightly so. The faith ,the conviction,the felt need or dissatisfaction is there and the mind through the instrumentality of the intellect, mainly,sets about to meet these demands. It is not however merely an affair of the intellect. The driving force of the soul is behind the intellect and its very activity is pervaded by the presence of these powers. Now ,if it is meant that the process should go forward in an intellectual manner,that the intellect should not be overwhelmed by the emotional power of the soul,

but should be allowed to keep the field clear it is an intellectual process. But it may easily be forgotten here that the intellect is only an instrument and that the demand for purely intellectual work is the demand for the most efficient use of this instrument. The intellect does,however, forever remain an instrument--an instrument of the soul. If,further , to be philosophical means that the result of this work should be clearly and consistently harmonious after the manner of the intellect it is not conceded that the whole of philosophy is a purely intellectual thing. For this which we call philosophy is a specific kind of activity and product. It is a formula ,a system of reality. But now the actual process of obtaining this is not merely intellectual except that the intellect is the instrument chosen for a work which is in itself more than intellectual. Or if it mean that philosophy is merely a playing of a game then it should be a purely intellectual game. But philosophy is not a game. If by this is meant that the game should be played well it amounts to saying only that the instrument of knowledge should be used effectually,which is admitted. And it if it be remembered that search for the real on the part of the philosopher is a search of the soul for its own complete self and that by its very nature the intellect is the instrument formed for that specific purpose, then little more need be insisted upon. For this means that the knowledge process is a living process and that the knowledge acquired is a knowledge of the soul. The fact that the nature of human life requires a communicable knowledge and that the self chooses to come to itself by an intellectual process will notblind one to the presence of other than intellectual elements,nor make on intellect an exclusive

faculty which can know a reality which is more than intellect and that without the aid of other elements of the mind itself.

The task of philosophy as conceived by Socrates is suggestive here. To develope conceptions is the more formal aspect of philosophy. We are interested in finding conceptions by which we may make clear to ourselves and communicable to others the meaning of the instinctive demands of our nature. As already seen, the intellect is just the faculty or type of activity by which the original and fundamental felt-somewhat becomes articulate. It becomes articulate by the formation and expression in conceptions. This,then, is much the life history of the soul and it is an eternal process. That which is real and true for us becomes expressed or symbolized by certain conceptions. But soon those become inadequate and finally the bonds are broken and there the endless task returns of forming new conceptions by which to make articulate this increased experience. Now one may call this more formal production of conceptions philosophy and the system of concepts which stands for the real a philosophical system. But it is plain that it is somewhat superficial. The real process is more inclusive. It includes the bursting of the bonds of concepts and the surging of life and activity of new experiences. The two go hand in hand and are in reality one and not two. Hence the knowledge of reality is not either but both,or better,the whole movement of life.

Aside from the inherent inability of the intellect to comprehend the real and in its nakedness to give us reality and an understanding of it, it is not at all apparent that an understanding of life and of reality is merely the property of the philosopher. Indeed it most certainly is not. It is

not so easy to define the way in which a philosopher knows and the way others not philosophers know. The philosopher developes a special way of trying to understand life and reality and yet there is nothing new and nothing quite different from that of the ordinary man. The philosopher is more systematic, more thorough ; reflective most of the time where the ordinary person is reflective little of the time. It is the philosopher's business to understand reality but if that mean merely to intellectualize he has,in the first place,missed the true meaning of understanding and ,secondly,condemns himself to barrenness and penury of knowledge.

To sum up then we have insisted that even if the understanding were merely an affair of the intellect this can never be satisfied so long as my nature as a whole or any legitimate part of it demand satisfaction . The intellect is not distinct as a faculty,above and irresponsible to my deepest self,but it is the organ of my self and its purposes. If there is a dissatisfaction in my being it will find its expression in the intellect. Indeed that is precisely the business of the intellect --to bring peace and harmony and to fulfill the needs of my dissatisfied and partial self. It is true that the satisfaction of my deeper self comes indirectly through the intellect but that only in part. It may be that the way of the intellect is not the only way toward satisfaction though of course it is the only philosophical way. But just because the intellect is what it is in relation to the self or soul it can never be merely a separate faculty. It can have no needs which are purely of itself. Ultimately they hark back to the deeper self which is their source and the arbiter of their fulfilment. There can be no purely

intelle tual demands or any purely intellectual satisfaction simply because there is no pure intellect.

In what way,now,shall we proceed if we are to gain knowledge? Well, at least the usual conception of knowledge should be somewhat altered and factors admitted as determining elements which have before been excluded. It has been assumed that knowledge is solely an affair of pure intellect and the deliverance of pure intellect constitutes knowledge . Of course if the conception of knowledge be arbitrarily limited to an affair of some faculty of the mind then the intellect should undoubtedly be given the credit. But knowledge cannot be thus limited. A faculty of knowledge is a useful and legitimate abstraction but to set it up as quite real in its own right is not justifiable . The procedure usually has been to acknowledge the deliverances of the intellect as the whole of knowledge-- it having been already assumed to be the faculty of knowledge-- and then the intellect has been set up formally as the seat and instrument of knowledge . The fact that the intellect is never free from the presence of non-intellectual elements has not been noted or sufficiently attended to and then,in view of the fact that intellect thus supplemented by other elements has been eminently successful, has given rise to the natural opinion that knowledge is purely a matter of the intellect. Moreover, the fact of the immense practical results from intellectual activity ,particularily in the sciences, together with the fact, that all communicable or social knowledge is an intellectualized

knowledge, has led to the belief that the intellect is the sole instrument of knowledge.

As a result of this assumption, the whole of life and experience which have not been clearly matters of intellect have been relegated to the field of romance, religion, or some other field where the intellect is supposed not to be supreme. A great body of significant facts and experiences of life have been rejected often in a very dogmatic manner. When ideals of life, ethical, religious, and aesthetic demands as well as experiences of great personages, and the catholic interests of the race have insisted upon recognition, they have usually been acknowledged as of some sort of value but not for the knowledge of reality. The mystic has maintained that he has a knowledge of reality which is non-intellectual but philosophy has largely ignored his claim. How often in the history of philosophy has the mystic been given serious consideration? Not very often. Yet he has been very numerous and he has never been surpassed in intellectual power. Thus it has come about that important doctrines in philosophy are lightly set aside as mystical and therefore not profitable or worthy of consideration. It is even a favorite way of dismissing a person and his doctrine by merely saying that he is mystical, or that this particular phase of his philosophy is a product of mysticism. Such a method is of course the very essence of dogmatism. And it is just this type of dogmatism which this essay aims to protest against. It matters little whether the final result should show that none of these things have a claim to affect the knowledge process but it does matter that they should be merely assumed not to do so. Philosophy has followed natural science here and assumes that such things

asfeeling,mysticism,religious and aesthetic experiences have no standing because seemingly not amenable to treatment by the methods of science. Now,it seems to me reasonably probable that such elements as religious and aesthetic experiences, ethical demands ,feelings, longings and aspiration may furnish an important element in the knowing of reality. It must not be forgotten that the task of knowing reality is infinite and that the manifestations of the real are innumerable . The manifoldness of the real as expressed in life is incomprehensible. It is idle to say that they may not all be vastly significant. The tendency of the intellect to run into barren formalism is notorious and it has always,I think, been prevented from doing so by the presence of other than intellectual elements. Life has often saved us from intellectual fruitlessness. If we are to know reality no phase of human experience may be ignored.

Instance the case of the genius. It is admitted that he has an infinitely deeper insight into life and the real than the ordinary person. What is the nature of that insight? What is its significance? Take Jesus as religious genius. How came he by the knowledge of life and men that he showed? To say that he was a genius does not explain. What is the secret of genius? That it is not merely or mainly hard work is plain, though the genius may work harder than any one else. Take any great artistic genius. He too has knowledge. How came Beethoven by his masterpieces? We have a transcription of notes or signs. But what was and is the real inner fact? Again how did Shakespeare with his restricted knowledge of the world get such an almost incredible knowledge of the world and men? He was a genius but also a man and human. Have we

any right to ignore such types of knowledge merely because it is unusual?

After recalling these great minds the question of what knowledge is and how we came by it is more bewildering than when we are thinking about the ordinary mind. We think we know what scientific knowledge is and we are inclined to make it the only valid knowledge. It is almost comparable to the attempt to set up a standard of religious or artistic experience. But we know that scientific knowledge is not the only knowledge. And we know that the knowledge of a genius --of a Jesus or a Beethoven--is not what we like to call knowledge. Some say that it is insight and that philosophy does not want insight or at least not insight merely.

Suppose one does call the knowledge of the genius insight. How does that help us to understand his knowledge? If we cannot find the goings of it how can we reject it, for we should do so not knowing what we were rejecting. And until every such kind of knowledge is resolved and understood it is sheer dogmatism to reject it as being unphilosophical. Of course it is not philosophical until it is philosophically usable. But the point is that it ought to be used if it has any value. We cannot intelligently exclude until we have understood. And what philosophy wants is knowledge of the real. If we say it does not want merely insight we speak as though we knew just what the limits of insight are. Do we? Now when one thinks of the genius one hesitates to restrict the mind to certain categories of knowledge. One wonders whether the experiences of great personalities and of the race as a whole, the great interests and demands of life may not indicate the

presence of categories which ought to be uncovered and mastered before we can advance in certain knowledge of reality. We may wonder if the mind as intellect is not a special case of the mind as knowing. An investigation of experience in its widest extent should find it to be so. I should never accept any man's experience as to what reality is but his experience may help me to know what the mind itself is ,and to know perfectly what the mind of man is is to know what reality itself is.

With the conception of the reason and the knowledge process,just indicated, in mind we may return to the more specific examination of method. It will be necessary to point out what use may be made of present methods, to point out their failures, and finally to suggest a conclusion based upon this and previous considerations.

With regard to induction,very little needs to be said. It cannot stand alone and apart from deduction it is of no value and indeed is impossible. When the method was first brought forward in modern times by Bacon recognition of nature was sorely needed. The particular fact of experience may never be ignored. They could not be if one desired it. But the claim that by induction one can arrive at a single highest principle, or the simple ,essential form of things is misplaced. We are not needing a highest principle or a simplest form. What we need is to arrive at meaning and that is something other than a principle or a form. The existence of a highest principle is an abstraction and in itself will explain nothing.

Deduction,in itself,is equally inadequate. Granted a highest principle, any amount of deducing may or may not be illumirating. Certainly the real cannot be deduced from principle.

It is quite possible for the mathematician to build a world of form and it may be done in a logical manner but it has no claims to existence. As a method, of course, deduction is never found apart from induction. Both are quite legitimate and natural methods of mental procedure. We cannot think without using them. They are thus and so far valid methods. But neverth less in themselves, even when found together, they are inadequate. Reality cannot be found by any amount of induction or deduction. Reality is not deducible from a principle. It is not a mathematical formula nor is it amenable to complete statement in terms of such formulae. Both methods assume that reality has a certain form which lends itself to the use of a particular method. But we cannot do in philosophy what is successfully done in science, thatis, assume that reality is of a certain nature or structure and by putting questions to it determine whether it is as assumed beforehand to be. Uniformity of nature may be assumed and then phenomena isolated and questioned so that the assumption stands confirmed. It should be pointed out, however, that of course one cannot really arrive at a complete induction establishing the principle of the uniformity of nature. It is a hypothesis, a guess, a veritable leap,-an intuition.

Now, you cannot isolate ultimate reality and perform an experiment upon it and thus determine whether your assumption be true or not. The conclusion of the scientist is always subject to a certain well defined limitation and the knowledge is knowledge only within these limitations. There is no induction not deduction of ultimate reality.

After the conception of the reason and the place of the intellect suggested above, we shall be able to criticise the method

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After the conception of the reason and the place of the intellect suggested above, we shall be able to criticise the method

of analysis. This was the method, we saw, by which Des Cartes hoped to reach positive and sure results in philosophy. It is always necessarily found together with synthesis but synthesis may be made at least to appear to perform a fairly subordinate work. Des Cartes reached by analysis what he thought an absolutely certain and fundamental principle. He did find that it is necessary to assume a unitary self. Now, without doubt "I think" but this was as far as this method of analysis would lead. That I am and that I think seem certain, but it is less certain that I am sure that I am because I think. That I am is assumed when the analysis is begun and it is not the analysis which proves the assumption to be correct. It may only reveal it. A moment of reflection will assure all that is needed here. Moreover when the analysis is complete, all else but the certainty of the self is not a matter of analysis. Des Cartes here brought in intuition, synthesis. The method of analysis will not apply to the reality as such. The results of analysis are valid, of course, so far as they go. And as said of induction and deduction it is a necessary form of procedure. But it is not sufficient as a method of philosophy.

No amount of analysis will reveal ultimate reality. It will not do this because analysis is the characteristic work of the intellect and shares the limitation which we have found the intellect to possess. We find, usually at the end, that something has escaped it which is necessary for the complete conception of the thing itself. Analysis will reveal the articulations of the real but the intuitional synthesis of is needed Des Cartes to complete the process. Analysis can bring order out of chaos, can make distinct and definite but it cannot push out

into the untrodden regions of the real. It is exactly the work of the intellect and the work of the intellect is not to discover. If analysis, it would mean that the real is capable of intellectual formulation, of being completely expressed in conceptions, of being pressed into the hard and artificial lines of an articulate system. That we do not believe is possible. Analysis is inadequate because of the inherent and necessarily inadequate character of the intellect. The intellect, we have found, has this limitation because it is an instrument, a product of the real itself.

The most original and successful attempt of the present day in this direction is that of Husserl. He calls his method that of phenomenological reduction. The reason why I do not know what the table, for instance, is is because I am not in the right attitude or position relative to it. I am not rightly adjusted to it. An object looks different to me when I occupy different positions relative to it. The coming to know it then is merely one of adjustment. If I get adjusted properly, to this table we may say, then I shall know it as it really is, as it is in its complete reality. The problem is one of adjusting myself to my object. The object is real. It is not real, however, as I now see it perhaps. Its reality is not that of particular tables but of <u>table</u>. There is the table which is the real table and if I adjust myself properly I shall know the real table. The method, then, is that of reduction, of phenomenal reduction. Consciousness has already been so reduced and found to be merely a matter of adjustment. Other may be likewise reduced and are expected to be.

The trouble with this, for one thing, is that it is seeking

the real in phenomena merely . Of course he insists that the real is actually to be found there but all who have ever started in to analyze particular have either ended with much less than the original fact or they have transcended it ,and find themselves trying to understand the particular from the viewpoint of the eternal. Of course objects appear different to me in different positions but most obj ct come to have a certain,more or less exact,physical reality and we accept certain "adjustments" as giving us the real object in its phenomenal aspect. It would seem to be a far cry from this comparatively simple process of adjustment and an adjustment which would give us the ultimate reality of the object. Reflection upon particular things always drives us to reflection on consciousness itself. And when the actual reality of consciousness is observed something beside analysis and reduction seem imperative. Analysis of a particular thing ,even of this table, will eventua ly drive one into speculation and the ultimate reality of it will finally be not reduced phenomena or analyzed object but constructed reality.

The procedure and doctrine of post-Kantian idealism is known by its opponents more particularly as intellectualism and felt to be something very bad indeed. The complaint is made, in general,that experience,facts,particulars,have been ignored and that philosophy thus becomes barren . The One is assumed and the Many are deduced from the One. Opponents claim that the Many are never reached in this way, that we are left with a " block-universe" on our hands. And such a reality is very disappointing to lovers of particulars and facts. Hegel is the arch-offender in this regard,according to the champions of "experience" and "facts". Plato is also an offender. Now

it is worthy of remark that in the case of each of these there was a noteworthy practical aspect and attention to experience. In a certain respect it was the crowning attempt of Plato to make his philosophy serve the Greek nation in a very practical way. It is true that he took his viewpoint in a non-temporal world. He was not a temporalist and that is what many modern writers in defense of experience would be. But notwithstanding Plato's idealism he did not disregard fact, experience, or particulars. It would be more just to Plato to say that he understand particular facts so well that he knew their explanation could not lie in themselves. Those who are so insistent upon attention to particular facts of experience are not always conscious of the probable fact that their failure to see the justification of an idealistic viewpoint is just that they themselves do not see deeply into those particular facts. It is not just to great idealists such as Plato to say that they forsake facts for barren speculation.

Now something of the same thing is true, it seems to me, with Hegel and post-Kantian idealists in general. Hegel did take his viewpoint in an other than purely factual position. And his method no doubt is justly condemned in many respects. But those critics who reject Hegel in a wholesale manner do not realize all that that rejection means. Hegel, as did Plato, placed himself in the eternities and view the world from there. He may have been arbitrary in some degree but when it is supposed that he merely ignored experience purely out of love for abstraction, it is unjust. Like Plato and like most idealists he saw the absolute necessity of viewing things, facts of experience, from a higher standpoint than mere sense experience. A thing, he saw, was in itself quite impossible of comprehension. He saw

particularly the insoluble contradiction of consciousness. He found himself forced to transcend particular facts in order to explain fact but his aim,as that of Plato,was to understand fact. If the particular way in which he conceived those facts was unsuccessful it is not therefore true that he left them out of distaste for them.

Mr Ward has taken considerable pains in "The Realm of Ends" to point out that Hegel actually did begin with the many of experience and that therefore his method was artificial. Mr Ward insists,therefore,that one must always begin with the many and gradually progress to the one. Now,no one will deny that Hegel did not begin with an absolute One and that he did begin with the manyness of experience. And yet ,such criticism may not be altogether correct. Who can say that one begins in philosophy with the one or the other? It is certainly true that the mind does not come to know many things and then one or visa versa . The terms are correlative and the comprehension of manyness and oneness advances together. Where in the history of the mind one is more prominent than the other might be hard to decide . Certain however that the reason for one choosing the one or the other as philosophy is the result of a life of accumulating feelings ,ideals,instincts,and desires . When one sits down to write a philosophy one does not begin then to choose what sort of philosophy one shall write, The choosing is made in great part before. One certainly does not,however,begin to be bothered first by an abstract One. but rather by the concrete Many of one's life. No one supposes that Hegel was not forced into his thought by a particular fact or facts of experience. But,as said above,he was forced beyond these for an explanation.

It is idle then to think that because by our very nature and environment we are chiefly concerned at first with concrete particulars of experience and that we, in a sense, begin there, that the Plato who discerns almost intuitively the absolute impossibility of understanding these facts in themselves and is forced to a grand intuition, that being a one is therefore forsaking experience and fact.

Mr Ward offers what he calls a "historical method" for philosophy. But where do we find a more passionate lover of history than Hegel was or who has ever conceived history so comprehensively and grandly as did Hegel, as a movement of spiritual life, of divine mind. To explain history was his greatest interest and it is not wholly necessary to explain it correctly to prove himself appreciative of it. Mr Ward and other critics of Hegel desire a more spiritual view of the world but it was Hegel who gave philosophy a spiritual view of the world and of reality in the face of the philosophical naturalism of his day. We may object to his method but one looks in vain for a more glorious vindication of the spiritual conception of the real. Of course there was much that was barren in his system but nevertheless theneed of today, when the methods of natural science are so supreme in philosophy, of such spiritual conceptions as those of Hegel and the post-Kantian idealists in general is plain.

As to arrival at the One by the historical method of Mr Ward there seems to me to be little reason for hope. We may not like breaks between the world and its highest reality but at present there is no continuous path and the intuitions of a Plato are necessary. If we are not allowed to make the leap we shall not arrive. That which divides philosophers into

natural science method schools and the more idealistic schools is just the difference as to this leap. Science will not take it. The idealist does and thinks it justified. The danger of those who insist upon keeping by mere particulars of experience is that they shall always remain just there. They fail to see that only a superficial knowledge of particulars may be had without making the grand leap.

Intuition is put forward as the peculiar method of philosophy. I agree that there is a faculty or type of activity in human knowledge and thinking which is at least akin to intuition and here is little objection to calling it such. It has the particular work of discovery, of a certain grasp or apprehension of the object, of a leap into the unknown. But as an adequate method it seems to me essentially illegitimate. It is less fitted, as method, than any of the more strictly intellectual types of procedure. Now we are told that by intuition one may put oneself into the very heart of reality and thus get an absolute knowledge of it. It is not said just how it is to be done. It is not said how we shall recognize what we have achieved or whether we shall ourselves be distinct from the real in knowledge. Mystics say not. We ought to have more information if we are to try seriously to use this method of intuition. But even supposing that we can project ourselves into the movement of living reality by an intuitive effort I fail to understand what we are then to do. If it mean a cessation of intellectual effort then the objections to mysticism may be applied to it. If it does not mean the extinction of the intellect it is quite sure that the intellect would immediately begin its traditional habit of analyzing and that would spoil everything. No one seems to claim to have so projected himself- except the mystic. Some

important change in the number of knowers would take place ,for knowledge would thus become a very exclusive affair. Concrete detail is surely wanted and would enliven our conception of this so-called method.

It really seems that the serious proposal of this method ignores some fundamental facts. In the first place,we have intellects and are not wholly responsible for being fitted out with them. It seems that in this life we must even think to survive . It seems,too, that we must think about ultimate reality. We seem to be forced into a certain way of getting along and that way has as an essential feature intellectual effort applied to the problem of reality. It hardly seems possible to help matters in that regard. It is said that had the initial impetus been absolute the process of evolution would have been forced through without the embarassment of intellectual obstacles. But if the fact is what it is we cannot help it since we ourselves are finite also. I see no way of gaining real knowledge except in the way marked out and that way most certainly includes the use of the intellect as a very important factor.

If the difficulty is the desire for genuine and living knowledge of the real then I would insist that we do have such knowledge. And it is not a merely intellectual sort of knowledge either. It is the self knowledge of the I, knowledge of a somewhat which is itself the real. I grant that this is a very meager and unsatisfactory knowledge and that it is of no immediate importance in itself. We want more than this mere somewhat. This bare fact of a felt whole is not enough. We are social beings and so situated that a certain development is imperative. That program includes thinking and all that we have found that to

imply with relation to the original somewhat. It sends us on a long search, a search that is eternally incomplete in its reward but which is increasingly rewarded in the enrichment and development of that very somewhat which is reality. Perhaps the reality itself is just this eternal search. The intellect is not a calamity at least. It is our most efficient instrument and we need not less nor poorer but more and better intellects.

It is quite usual nowadays to insist on experience in some form. Sometimes it is meant as the method of finding the real. Everyone apparently wants to be true to experience and to build upon it. It is the most tyrannical of criteria. No one dares to contradict it and sometimes even to question it. It is even said by many that reality is experience -with a capital.

In popular language such phrases as these are constantly heard: "experience is the best teacher" ; "that was a great experience"; "lack of experience" ; "the experience of the race" ; "inexperience". Here experience means variously, a living of real events, of participation in events of which the sensations and feelings furnish a the peculiar quality, the personal knowledge or acquaintence with the real, immediate, vital knowledge. Or it is a knowledge of or skill gained from such actual contact with the real. It is opposed to the merely imaginary, fanciful, and sometimes to the theoretical. In some cases it is tested knowledge. Or it is the actual demonstration of one's knowledge. It implies a knowledge that may be possessed and not used to advantage.

One mark of experience is that of certainty. Whatever it may mean it carries a feeling of absolute certainty.

One knows absolutely what one has experienced-at least that one has experienced something. The appeal to experience is supposed to be an appeal to fact. It is in this character that science gains its sway over the imagination. Scientific knowledge is knowledge derived through experiments. Science is method applied to experience.

Another mark is that of felt immediacy and personal ownership. It is immediate as opposed to mediate knowledge. I suppose this is what is meant by "pure" experience though I do not know. It is knowledg not about but of the real.

Perhaps the most characteristic mark is that of its emotional or feeling aspect. An experience is essentially and in the last analysis something felt or a feeling of something. This is its strength as an appeal to knowledge. The certainty of experience is not logical but that of feeling. The sense element is inseparable from experience in its usual sense.

Now,the procedure of some philosophers is loudly condemned because they fail to follow experience or perhaps they ignore experience. The empirical method is the only safe and true method in gaining knowledge. The particular fact must be adhered to and attempts to transcend it only lead to barren abstractions. We cannot know universals,we can know particulars only. Perceptual knowledge is the only true knowledge. Conceptions are used only until perceptions may be substituted.

I suppose that it is the sense element ,the immediacy, the felt certainty which gives the empirical method its importance in the general popular esteem. We seem to be more certain of the brute facts of this world than of the more civilized ones. Universals are unreal. Only particulars are real,hence stand

by the particulars. Now in the first place, it is logically impossible to hold to a particular fact. When I assert it as an individual I thereby make it universal in being unique. It is this particular fact as over against all other facts. It is"here" and "now". Any judgment about a particular fact is an individual judgment and hence universal. It is impossible to stay by mere particulars. To assert that there are only particulars is to make a universal judgment. Thus we are confused.

If the necessity is to cling to the essentials ,I cannot see how we are to get far. For the sensuous has been analyzed into mere sensations or ideas in me and merely perceptual knowledge gets only a very little way. I cannot perceive very much--some color,taste,etc. The rest is due to the constructive activity of the mind. There is very little in empirical knowledge that is of the sensational character. Even the great facts of science are not sense facts at all. We depend very little on brute fact for most empirical knowledge . Most of it is of the kind that the empiricist thinks dangerous. One cannot get very far on the road to reality with merely an empirical knowledge. Experience is worth very little in itself. Its certainty may be very great but it is worth little unless it have in addition a conceptual character. Then of course it was long ago shown that experience itself presupposes the laws of reason and this is one place where Plato has the better of his modern critics. The empiricist,however, is not expected to regard this fact as either true or important. Such rationalism is what he wants to destroy by empiricism. Anyway experience will have to be taken in a much deeper sense

before it is of the importance insisted upon by all idealists.

Perhaps this deeper meaning of experience is what Mr James means to offer in what he calls "pure experience". This presumeably is meant to be something other than plain everyday experience. Or at least it should be distinguishable from such either by refinement or by some sort of purification. Well, experience I know and consciousness. but "pure" experience looks suspiciously like a highly speculative hypothesis in which all that James loved in the particular facts of life is left out. It seems to me to be the result of an attempt to raise mere sensuous and perceptual knowledge to the plain of philosophical knowledge and an abandonment of his essential contention. The Ideas of Plato are not more rarified or less concrete than this"pure"experience .

We are told that there is only one kind of primal stuff of which everything is composed and "....if we call that stuff 'pure experience', then knowing can be easily explained as a particular sort of relation of one another into which portions of pure experience may enter". "The relation itself is a part of pure experience".(Radical Empiricism, [illegible]) Knowledge, then, is a relation and this relation is a matter of pure experience and the knowledge of this relation as being a matter of pure experience is also a relation and a matter of pure experience also. So runs the world away. Now the knowledge which is so easily understood as being only a particular kind of relation between bits of this pure experience is itself nothing but a bit of pure experience. The idea,then, has no reference beyond itself, nor does it transcend itself. It is merely a link in a chain of emporal order of events. But how do we know that reality

is- as James holds -- just the temporal order of events unless knowledge transcends that order itself? We not only have a knowledge of particular events but of an order of those particular events. And furthermore the knowledge of this order and succession of events is itself merely a relation existing between bits of pure experience, which is also itself a bit of pure experience. How then on this theory can we experience order or succession? Do we actually experience this order and succession of events in addition to the events themselves. James holds that the relations and the terms are equally matters of pure experience and that change itself is an ultimate fact; which of course must be known and the knowing of which is only a particular kind of relation between two bits of pure experience. What then are the terms of this relation--the knowledge that change is ultimate? It is very plain that all this has nothing to do with particulars and facts and experience which we know as actual. That we have here a bit of speculation which cannot be surpassed for barrenness seems evident. "Pure experience" is certainly something quite different from actual experience. Knowledge and the method of knowing are quite different from what we know as the knowledge of experience and the method of gaining experimental knowledge of actual particular concrete facts and objects. Such empiricism is certainly radical but so radical that all real empiricism has long since been quite uprooted. It not only goes to the root of the matter but it actually uproots the matter itself. It is a vicious radicalism.

The radical critic of the intellect and so-called intellectualism in philosophy and the upholders of the experience philosophy are very much opposed to conceptual knowledge and

conceptual thinking. As a substitute they would offer a purely perceptual type of thinking or activity. Conception at most is tolerated only as preliminary to the perception of the real. Conceptions are due to the infirmity of the flesh. It is the vice of intellectualism. Knowledge in conception is not true knowledge. Only perceptual knowledge is real. We have to use conceptions, to be sure, but only because, according to M. Bergson and others, our present perceptions do not reach far enough. If our present perceptual experience were merely extended far enough it would give us the real as it is in itself. Our whole present attempt to know the real, then, is vitiated by this falsifying : intellectual conception.

Upon the view of knowledge suggested above it is quite unnecessary to assume that conceptions give us complete knowledge of reality. In fact, the view would not permit such an interpretation. It is distinctly maintained that purely conceptual knowledge cannot give us the real in its completeness. The real is given in the highest form in an experience or a type of knowledge which is more than intellectual conception. An intellectually acquired knowledge, in so far as it is the work of the intellect itself is never what we know in ourselves reality to be or what we mean by the real. In this sense conceptual knowledge is inadequate and incomplete. I do not want the real wholly conceptualized. I do not want my experienced reality , the felt somewhat which to me is the very heart of the real, to be transformed wholly into conceptions. For I know that then it would be something alien, something artificial, something rigid, in short a dead reality. But reality to me is most personal, most living, most fluid and is the deepest experience of myself. I do not want this

changed into symbols, pressed into a halting language which others may read and know that my reality is formal, artificial, and lifeless.

On the other hand I recognize and insist that my chief mental activity is just to be forever bringing that life and reality to expression in conceptions. I cannot help that but what is more I desire it. I do not want the real to remain a mere felt somewhat or original feeling. My very nature as a social self requires that this be so far as possible transformed into an intellectualized, conceptualized knowledge. I rest secure and at ease knowing that the infinity of selfhood and reality can never, by its very nature, be transmuted into a conceptual system and exhibited to the world. I know that the infinite richness and manifoldness of the real cannot be expressed in symbols -- or at least completely so. I know because I see every moment that richness slipping through the lines of articulation and even as I write realize that what I mean is more than what I say or even what I have in conception. Yet I could not say anything were it not for conceptions.

If this be a grevious contradiction, the only answer is that such contradiction is the lot of finitude. If the contradiction could be resolved the richness of the real would disappear with it. Consciousness is contradictory and that because it is both finite and absolute. In its deepest and ultimate reality it is one with the Absolute Self. But in its finiteness it is forever less than that absolute or universal Self. It is this contradiction which has forced the minds of men since Plato beyond the mere finite self to the absolute viewpoint.

It is clear now what must be said of perceptual knowledge. As we found in the view of intellect taken by M. Bergson, it is too

extreme. It ignores actualities of our finite selfhood. No way is pointed out whereby we may dispense with intellect and conception. It is admitted that we must use them now. But no specific way is shown by which human thinking is to be radically changed. There is too much of an inclination not to accept what is actual and judge that from its inherent possibilities. It seems idle to reject the work of intellect and conception in the history of thought but if this is not done the actual place which they fill should be granted and if it is a foreign, mistaken element in ones make-up it should be explained. It seems better to accept intellect and conception as valid and essential factors in human knowledge and to determine their proper significance.

The methods so much emphasized, then, seem to be inadequate to deal with the problem. Present day philosophy would seem to be suffering, in the first place, from a dominance of the methods and ideals of natural science. Owing to the dominant influence of natural science in modern times philosophy has, to a considerable extent, given up the search for highest reality. Either scientific knowledge has been accepted as absolute knowledge of the real or else such absolute knowledge is given up as beyond the reach of the mind. Philosophy will then be a critical science. But what is this science of critical philosophy? If it takes its viewpoint wholly with that of science then there is no reason for calling it a philosophy. If it criticise the metaphysical assumptions and the theories of past and present then it must do so from a metaphysical point of view and loses

its strictly scientific character. For science has nothing to do with metaphysica assumptions-- except perhaps to remain ignorant of the swarm of them upon which it itself is based! A critical philosophy would seem to live by virtue of metaphysical assumptions and theory of the past and present. Now there can be no objection to having philosophers who are primarily critics. Criticism is necessary but it is quite a different thing that such critics should insist upon appropiating the whole field of philosophy for a purely critical science. [illegible] some one does constructive work there will be no field for criticism and thus, if his ideal were realized, the critic would cut off his own subject-matter.

The basis and the weakness of all such types of philosophy is that an essential element in human thought is ignored. Philosophers must be constructive as well as critical unless their work is to remain purely negative. And this constructive activity depends upon that object which the criticist ignores. The criticist may base his philosophy upon a narrow, incorrect view of knowledge. The merely intellectual is assumed to be the only valid element in reason and knowledge. So, "demands" of the moral consciousness or other elements of our nature are valid for the criticist. They are only postulates and yet Kant himself held the dictates of moral consciousness as absolutely binding and authoritative and in reality accepted them as true of reality. How else could they be accepted if not as true? There seems little doubt that Kant shut himself out from acceptance of metaphysical truth as the basis of a certain view of knowledge which is not wholly valid. But this refusal to accept such knowledge was only formal for he did in fact accept it as knowledge.

No one can act on that which he does not accept as true if he have Kant's honesty. And if a thing is accepted as true or really and acted upon it cannot be said to be anything but knowledge for that person. That which is taken as true for us and not that which we can demonstrate as true makes up our knowledge.

We must conclude therefore that the first requisite of any proper method must recognize the presence of other than purely intellectual elements in the knowledge process. It is the ignoring of this which is the fundamental weakness of most methods in philosophy. This is the chief result of this discussion and the starting point for the suggestion of an adequate method.

The knowledge process, it seems to me, has two fundamental aspects, based on two types of mental activity. These two aspects may be termed discovery and analysis. The former is based primarily on the more strictly non-intellectual activity of the mind. The latter is the characteristic work of the more purely intellectual type of activity. These are not isolated the one from the other. But when we look at the mind's action we can see these two methods of procedure. They are the, perhaps better, the ways in which the mind does somewhat different kinds of work.

Analysis is more evident to us since it is that activity which brings the real to us in symbols. It is primarily the making of knowledge communicable, and hence clearly conscious to ourselves. Its fundamental quality is clearness, distinctness, sharpness in outline and detail, precision etc. It is this type of activity which gives us scientific knowledge in its

finished,social,practical or usable character. It can work only with the material on hand. It cannot discover new material of knowledge; it is not constructive or creative.

Discovery,on the other hand,is much less tangible. It gives us material with which analysis works. It is the method or type of activity which makes progress in new truth possible. It is the more original,closer to the living,akin to intuition,imagination,feeling,and insight. Here belong the great intuitions of science, the discovery of great truths and formation of grand hypotheses. Here belong also the mystical types of knowing,the intuitions of genius,etc. Analysis cannot make leaps. These are made by the type of activity which we here term discovery. Analysis works with the given, the given itself is acquired by this process of discovery. This type of activity never results in a formulated system of knowledge ; that is the work of the intellect as such. Hence its knowledge is private and is made a social knowledge by the activity of the intellect.

It is this type of activity which is so commonly ignored. And yet without it the other type is impossible because it depends upon this. That it is unformulated,intangible is not proof that it is not also fundamental. It is the basis of all activity and the source of our faith. Convictions and practical certainties are also based on this. It is this which gives to knowledge its living,vital,personal character.

The method of philosophy then is a combination of the two fundamental forms of mental activity . Thus combined it may preferably be called reflection ,yet it must be clearly understood that this reflection is not a formal manipulation of

concepts but includes both discovery and analysis. Hence it is really one activity but made up of two different forms, one or the other of which may predominate under different circumstances. In general the analytic activity will appear the most common and evident because of its very nature. But nevertheless, there is always the other element present. Reflection, thus understood, is not a merely intellectual activity but is permeated by this more living and personal form of activity. While the analytic consists more in the outlines and the element of discovery more of the living character which fills out those outlines, the former will necessarily be more tangible, more evident to oneself and to others. But the innumerable, the almost undefinable intuitions which accompany all reasoning, the peculiar fascinating enjoyment in the most abstract performances of the intellect such as in, for instance, mathematical speculations, the reaching out into the dark, for that which we only believe to be there, the felt certainties, the faiths which tide us over trackless wastes, the longings for that which is not a known possession but which ought to be, the insistent demands of various elements of our nature and the unshaken convictions of the soul, all these have their basis in the activity which in its recognizable form we call discovery. It is the type whose significance in knowledge needs to be understood and used if possible.

Now, if the method of reflection suggested here is important it will matter little where one begins or tries to begin, whether with one of many--one must always finally come back to the self and to consciousness and the experiences of the self. Thus in reality the beginning is not really with the particular thing or with an abstract One as some imagine but with consciousness itself.

attempts to begin otherwise will prove to be only preliminary skirmishes the real attack being possible only when consciousness is the starting point.

When one begins with reflection upon consciousness and the experiences of the self one will easily discover ,it seems to me,the presence of other than purely intellectual activities in the knowledge process. And if such an activity as that which has been called discovery is found ,an effort should be made to find its true significance. One would then give consideration to claims of intuitionists,artistic and religious genius,fundamental demands ,and convictions of human nature. Their significance should be determined. If additional categories should be discovered one should proceed accordingly and not ignore them.

Reflection upon consciousness will quite surely carry one beyond them and here the ultimate character of the real will be inquired after. It is in this more metaphysical task that the type of activity which may be called discovery will be found most useful, and also when it will be most abundantly justified. It shoul be used constantly and the result criticised with the consciousness of the part such non-intellectual elements may have played. Only then will the significance of the results of philosophical activity be seen and only then will it be possible to value them for what they are worth.

It is my contention that philosophy halts because it assumes formally that nothing but pure intellect counts and yet at the same time it used,in some cases unconsciously,much that is non-intellectual. As a fact other elements are present and produce certain results and yet no account is given of them. They are not properly evaluated . Their significance is not

understood or inquired into. This, it seems to me, is a species of dogmatism and vicious too. My first point is that such dogmatism should be removed. Whether such elements are valid or significant or not they should be examined and a verdict based upon analysis and its results given. But, I believe, secondly, that such non-intellectual elements do not only exist but that they have determinative effects and that they are in reality profoundly significant. That which is highest and most enduring in philosophy results from deeper and more intimately personal demands than formal intellectual demands. Every philosophy shows it and to deny it is to remove such that is fundamental in philosophy. Whether as intellectualists we like it or not every true philosopher holds that to be true which ought be true and that 'oughtness' is not merely or mainly an intellectual demand. The philosopher may make himself believe that his philosophy is merely an affair of his intellect but in this he mistakes his philosophy for the reasons or the formula what intellect gives him. However, this should not discourage him from attempting to give the best reasons or formula for the faith which is in him.

The method of philosophy, therefore, must be conscious of this fact of knowledge in the knowledge process. The method must include a conscious use of such non-intellectual elements. This, we have tried to show, will be a combination of analysis and discovery which may be termed reflection. This reflective method will be applied to consciousness and its relation to the world of experience. For the real world must be sought in the self and its world. The frank acceptance of such an element in one's method would permit the philosopher

to voice the highest and best demands of life without fearing that he is unphilosophical. This would in turn do away with much of the barrenness and formalism of philosophy and also serve as a basis for those who find something in life and in reality too high and too precious to be sacrificed because it is demanded by out deepest nature and not discoveralbe by intellectual analysis. When this is done philosophy may be permitted to shake off its natural science servility and return to its true mission of an earnest and courageous seaper for highest truth and reality .

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